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BAD FAITH IN THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION CONTEXT: A CAUSE IN
SEARCH OF AN ACTION
Edward John Main*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will address the application of bad faith principles to a
claim for benefits under a workers' compensation insurance policy.
Thorough analysis reveals that established principles of workers' com-
pensation law1 severely limit the possibility of a separate claim action-
able in the District Court (as distinct from the Workers'
Compensation Court), but nevertheless suggests the potential for two
distinct forms of action. The first, a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, may arise during the processing of a claim when
the insurer steps outside of its role as a workers' compensation carrier
to establish a "special relation" with the plaintiff. The second would
be a bad faith claim arising only after the Workers' Compensation
Court has entered an order awarding benefits. Although the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has, to date, not fully recognized either of
these causes of action, it has discussed the possibility of such claims.
II. DISCUSSION: GOODWIN V. OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first addressed the possibility of a
bad faith cause of action relating to workers' compensation insurance
claims in Goodwin v. Old Republic Insurance Co.2 The matter before
the Court in Goodwin was a claim for bad faith from an alleged failure
* Associate, Secrest, Hill & Folluo, Tulsa, Oklahoma. B.A., 1969, J.D., 1986, University
of TIsa; M.A., 1974, Ph.D., 1982, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.
1. Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 1-211 (West 1992
& Supp. 1995).
2. 828 P.2d 431 (Okla. 1992).
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to make payments pursuant to an award of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Court.3 Although the Goodwin opinion fell short of recognizing
or endorsing this bad faith cause of action, it made at least a tacit
acknowledgment of the claim.
The plurality opinion based its analysis on the assumption that a
bad faith cause of action is viable in the workers' compensation con-
text.4 It then held that "the facts of this case do not support an action
for bad faith."5 This analysis simultaneously makes a clear holding
that the plaintiff did not have a valid claim and an unclear assumption
as to what law the Court applied.
The plurality apparently used the terms "assume" and "hold"
very carefully and deliberately. Clearly, the plurality did not intend to
hold that this bad faith cause of action exists in Oklahoma law or will
exist by virtue of a subsequent holding. Several Oklahoma Supreme
Court decisions demonstrate that what the Court assumes in one opin-
ion may be rejected in another. For example, in a discussion of the
principles of "dram shop" liability, the Court stated:
For the purpose of disposing of these cases we assume, but do not
hold, that the abrogation in Brigance [v. Velvet Dove Restaurant,
Inc., 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986)] of the common-law's causation bar-
rier operates to benefit not only a third person injured by an intoxi-
cated consumer but also the inebriated vendee himself.
Despite this "assum[ption]" in one case, the Court "held" the opposite
in a subsequent opinion:
3. Id. at 432. The claim was based upon an "award [which] became due and payable on
June 3, 1983." Id. The insurer paid the claim 18 days after the award became due and payable.
Id. The plaintiff alleged "that the appeal of the [Workers' Compensation Court] orders, without
a likelihood of success, and the delay in payment of the awards once mandate was spread of
record, constituted bad faith." Id. The opinion does not discuss how or why the award "became
due and payable on June 3, 1983." Id. That date may reflect when mandate issued on the ap-
peal. For example, the Court cited OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 619(a)(6) (West 1990), which
refers to "an insurer's obligation 'to pay any final judgment rendered against it in Oklahoma
within thirty (30) days after the judgment became final."' Id. at 432 n.2. This cite suggests that
mandate on the appeal issued 30 days prior to June 3,1983, and that the award "became due and
payable" on the expiration of that period. Id. Justice Doolin, concurring specially, observed that
"[tihe alleged cause of action did not arise until after Goodwin had made his claim and had
received all the remedies provided by the [Workers' Compensation] Act." Id. at 436 (Doolin, J.,
concurring specially).
4. Id. at 431-32. "We assume that a workers' compensation insurance company may be
subjected to liability in tort for a wilful, malicious and bad faith refusal to pay an employee's
workers' compensation award .... Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The first clause of
this passage is also the title for part one of the plurality opinion. Id. at 432.
5. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This language is repeated as the final sentence
of the plurality opinion. Id. at 436.
6. McClelland v. Post No. 1201, VFW, 770 P.2d 569, 573 n.16 (Okla. 1986) (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 30:507
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The public policy of protecting the innocent from the intoxicated
would not be furthered by such an extension of Brigance.7
The distinction between "assume" and "hold" is explicit in the lan-
guage of McClelland and Ohio Casualty, and the same distinction is
implicit in the careful use of those terms in Goodwin.
The distinction becomes explicit in the special concurrence by
Justice Summers.8 Justice Summers emphasized that he would go fur-
ther than the plurality because he considered its "assumption unassail-
able." 9 That is, the plurality (which he called the "majority") merely
assumed the bad faith cause of action to exist whereas Justice Sum-
mers would formally recognize such a cause of action.10
The existence of an ordinary bad faith cause of action within the
workers' compensation context is problematic because of the special
circumstances surrounding workers' compensation law. Workers'
compensation is essentially a compromise which "has the net effect of
imposing a form of strict liability upon the employer to pay for indus-
trial accidents."" When an employee experiences such a job related
injury, the employer is obligated to make payments pursuant to the
Act.12 When there is liability under the Act, that liability is exclu-
sive. 13 Exclusive jurisdiction for claims arising under the Act is con-
ferred upon the Workers' Compensation Court, and the jurisdiction of
other Courts is abrogated.' 4
The plurality in Goodwin "noted that the exclusivity provisions of
the Statute relates to the liability of the employer-not that of the
insurer."' 5 Nevertheless, "the intent of the Workmen's Compensation
Law is to make the insurance carrier one and the same as the em-
ployer as to liability and immunity."' 6 By custom and practice, an em-
ployer's workers' compensation insurance carrier is joined as a party
7. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 512 (Okla. 1991) (holding that an
intoxicated plaintiff could not sue the vendor for the plaintiff's own injuries).
8. Goodwin, 828 P.2d at 437 (Summers, J., concurring specially).
9. Id. at 438.
10. Id. (stating that prior holdings must be disturbed or the workers' compensation statutes
altered to formally recognize a bad faith cause of action in the workers' compensation context).
11. Weber v. Armco, Inc., 663 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Okla. 1983).
12. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (West Supp. 1995).
13. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West 1992).
14. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 122 (West 1992).
15. Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 432 (Okla. 1992) (emphasis omitted)
(discussing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West 1992)).
16. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Theus, 493 P.2d 433, 435 (Okla. 1972).
1995]
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to an action before the Workers' Compensation Court.17 In addition,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that
[e]xcept when the Workmen's Compensation laws of this state au-
thorize, or provide for, the determination of particular matters aris-
ing under those laws, by some other court or courts, the [Workers'
Compensation Court] has the exclusive, original jurisdiction to de-
termine... the liability of... insurance carriers under those laws,
and any rights asserted under those laws18
Thus, according to well-established principles of Oklahoma law, the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court extends to
a claim an employee may have against an employer's carrier for bene-
fits. "The Workers' Compensation Court is vested with exclusive juris-
diction to determine and enforce a compensation risk carrier's liability
to a claimant."' 9 Therefore, the liability of a workers' compensation
carrier to an injured employee is a function of Oklahoma workers'
compensation law.
Under Oklahoma law, a third-party beneficiary has standing to
maintain a bad faith action against an insurer.2 ° The plurality also
noted that "the Legislature specifically provided.., that workers are
third-party beneficiaries of the employer's liability policy with the in-
surer."21 However, the statute which grants a worker third-party ben-
eficiary status is a part of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act,
which also contains provisions limiting jurisdiction for claims and
available remedies.' Apart from the special "trade off" effected by
17. The forms provided by the Workers' Compensation Court identify the employer's car-
rier as a party to the action. Workers' Compensation Court Rule 13 states that when an em-
ployee has commenced a proceeding "a copy of that notice of claim form bearing the assigned
case number and the filing date shall be mailed by the Court to the employer or the insurance
carrier." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, Ch.4, App. (West 1992).
18. State ex reL Ammons v. Breckenridge, 442 P.2d 506, 509 (Okla. 1968).
19. State Ins. Fund v. Brooks, 755 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. 1988) (citation omitted).
20. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 29 (West 1992). The statute states that "a contract made
expressly for the benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time before the parties
thereto rescind it." Id. The Goodwin Court noted that the named beneficiary under a life insur-
ance policy, pursuant to this statute, could maintain a bad faith action. Goodwin v. Old Republic
Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 434 (Okla. 1992). See Roach v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 769 P.2d 158 (Okla.
1989).
21. Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 432 (Okla. 1992) (citing OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, § 653 (West 1992)).
22. Third party beneficiary status is conferred by OKu.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 65.3 (West
1992) while exclusivity of jurisdiction for claims and remedies is established pursuant to OKA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 11, 12, 44, 122 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
[Vol. 30:507
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the workers' compensation law, a worker with a claim against an em-
ployer would be merely a third-party claimant to any liability insur-
ance maintained by that employer. 3 However, an ordinary third-
party claimant does not have standing to maintain a bad faith action.24
Therefore, any status a worker may have to maintain an action against
a workers' compensation insurance carrier is a status created by the
Act and is limited by the Act. In other words, the legal effect of the
statute making a worker a third-party beneficiary is to give that
worker standing to maintain an action against the carrier in the Work-
ers' Compensation Court. It would not have the effect of giving a
worker standing to assert a claim against a carrier based upon princi-
ples of tort liability which are separate and apart from the limited
remedies available under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Under the Act, "[t]he Workers' Compensation Court is vested
with exclusive jurisdiction to determine and enforce a compensation
risk carrier's liability to a claimant."'  Accordingly, a claimant has
standing to enforce the policy between an employer and the em-
ployer's workers' compensation carrier, but any such claim must be
brought in the Workers' Compensation Court. Since a bad faith ac-
tion would be maintained to impose liability upon a compensation risk
carrier of a claimant, such an action would fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court. Therefore, because
such an action may not be maintained in the Workers' Compensation
Court, it may not be maintained by a worker at all.
The plurality in Goodwin relied upon the earlier case of Christian
v. American Home Assurance Co.26 In Christian, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court applied the following principle: "It is an elementary
rule that a cause of action cannot be split or divided and made the
subject of several suits, but that [the] plaintiff must include in one ac-
tion all the various items of damage he has suffered from defendant's
wrong."27 However, the Court concluded that the rule against split-
ting a cause of action would not bar the plaintiff's claim in that case
because of "the unique and nonrecurring circumstances presented
here .... ,"I Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that, in
the typical case, the rule against splitting a cause of action would be a
23. See Weber v. Armco, Inc., 663 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Okla. 1983).
24. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364-65 (Okla. 1984).
25. State Ins. Fund v. Brooks, 755 P.2d 653, 650 (Okla. 1988) (footnote omitted).
26. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
27. Id. at 905 (citation omitted).
28. Id.
1995]
5
Main: Bad Faith in the Workers' Compensation Context: A Cause in Search
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
bar to maintaining separate actions for claims under a policy in one
Court while maintaining a claim for bad faith in another Court. The
exception would be the presence of extreme, unusual, unique, and
nonrecurring circumstances.
When the rule against splitting a cause of action is applied in the
context of a claim for workers' compensation benefits, a bad faith
clause of action should not be available, at least not prior to the entry
of an Order of the Workers' Compensation Court awarding benefits.
Any claim for benefits under the policy would fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court. 9 Therefore, any
action a claimant would maintain would be limited by the remedies
available under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the Workers' Com-
pensation Court has exclusive jurisdiction over any actions an em-
ployee may maintain against an employer's insurance carrier.3 In
addition, the Court has held that the carrier is entitled to invoke the
same defenses available to the employer (including the exclusivity of
jurisdiction) stating that "the intent of the Workmen's Compensation
Law is to make the insurance carrier one and the same as the em-
ployer as to liability and immunity."31
In Goodwin, the Court addressed an alleged bad faith failure to
make payments after the Workers' Compensation Court had entered
an award and the award had become due and payable.32 Justice
Doolin in his special concurrence specifically noted that "[t]he alleged
cause of action should not arise until after Goodwin had made his
claim and had received all the remedies provided by the Act. '33 The
basic principles of workers' compensation law suggest that there is no
possibility of a bad faith claim prior to the entry of an award by the
Workers' Compensation Court, at least not without severely altering
or abrogating well-established law.34
29. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West 1992).
30. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Theus, 493 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1972). In Theus, the
Court issued a Writ of Prohibition to bar maintenance of an ordinary tort action in District
Court. Id. Theus continues to be the law in Oklahoma. See State Ins. Fund v. Brooks, 755 P.2d
653, 658 (Okla. 1988). There is no indication that the Goodwin plurality intended to alter or
abrogate well-settled principles of Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Law, notwithstanding the
plurality's comment that the statutes refer to the liability of the employer, not the insurer.
Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 432 (Okla. 1992).
31. Theus, 493 P.2d at 435 (emphasis added).
32. Goodwin, 828 P.2d at 432.
33. Id. at 436 (Doolin, J., concurring specially).
34. Id.
[Vol. 30:507
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Even after an award by the Workers' Compensation Court, a sub-
sequent bad faith action in another court would be severely limited.
The Workers' Compensation Act contains specific procedures for ren-
dering an award of the Workers' Compensation Court enforceable in
another Court." In these procedures, it is arguable that a bad faith
claim may not be maintained, and in fact will not even accrue, until
after an order of the Workers' Compensation Court has been entered
and certified to another Court for enforcement. 6 The Workers' Com-
pensation Court would continue to have jurisdiction over even an in-
tentional failure by a carrier to make timely payments pursuant to an
award. As stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, "[p]ositive re-
quirements of § 122 of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act deprived
the district courts of any jurisdiction over matters properly within
[the] scope of [the] Workmen's Compensation Act."3" However, it is
possible that an employee faced with such circumstances may either
elect to continue to pursue the remedies available under the Workers'
Compensation Act for failure to pay an award, or maintain a separate
35. The procedures are as follows:
A. If payment of compensation or an installment payment of compensation due under
the terms of an award, except in case of appeals from an award, is not made within ten
(10) days after the same is due by the employer or insurance carrier liable therefor, the
Court may order a certified copy of the award to be filed in the office of the court clerk
and the county clerk of any county, which award whether accumulative or lump sum
shall be entered on the judgment docket of the district court, and shall have the same
force and be subject to the same law as judgments of the district court. Any compensa-
tion awarded and all payments thereof directed to be made by order of the Court shall
bear interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per year from the date ordered paid
by the Court until the date of satisfaction. Upon the filing of the certified copy of the
Court's award a writ of execution shall issue and process shall be executed and the cost
thereof taxed, as in the case of writs of execution, on judgments of courts of record, as
provided by Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Provided, however, the provisions of
this section relating to execution and process for the enforcement of awards shall be
and are cumulative to other provisions now existing or which may hereafter be adopted
relating to liens or enforcement of awards or claims for compensation.
B. If any insurance carrier intentionally, knowingly, or willfully violates any of the
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act or any published rules or regulations
promulgated thereunder, the Insurance Commissioner, on the request of a Judge of the
Court or the Administrator, shall suspend or revoke the license or authority of such
insurance carrier to do a compensation business in this state.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 42 (West 1992). This statute establishes the Workers' Compensation
Court's continuing jurisdiction over claims where an award of that Court has not been paid. The
Court retains that jurisdiction until the award is certified to another court. Due to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court, no other Court would have jurisdiction over
an award that has not been paid prior to certification.
36. Id.
37. Crowder v. Continental Materials Co., 590 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla. 1979).
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bad faith action in District Court.3 8  Moreover, the previously dis-
cussed principles regarding "splitting a cause of action" also suggest
that a claimant must first certify the order for enforcement through
another Court before maintaining a bad faith action.39
Prior to such certification, a claimant would not have a claim for
benefits pursuant to the award. Such an action would have to be
brought exclusively before the Workers' Compensation Court. The
claimant would then have two separate causes of action, one for the
benefits ordered by the Court (maintainable only in the Workers'
Compensation Court) and one for bad faith (maintainable only in the
District Court). Nevertheless, both actions would relate to the same
underlying "transactions", i.e., the circumstances of the carrier's fail-
ure to make payments as ordered. Oklahoma adheres to a "transac-
tional" analysis pursuant to which a single course of conduct, or a
single set of "wrongful acts" gives rise to only one cause of action.4"
Therefore, the same course of conduct should give rise to but one
claim actionable in but one Court. If the conduct is the subject of
proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Court, that Court
would have exclusive jurisdiction until and unless the statutory steps
are taken for making such an order enforceable in some other Court.
38. See, e.g., Pryse Monument Co. v. District Ct. of Kay County, 595 P.2d 435 (Okla. 1979).
In Pryse, the employer was subject to workers' compensation law, but did not maintain the
required insurance. Id. at 436. The Court concluded that the claimant could proceed in either
the Workers' Compensation Court or the District Court. Id. However, once the employee had
selected a forum, he would be barred from pursuing a claim in the other forum. Id. at 437. More
specifically, the Court held that the employee's election to pursue a claim before the Workers'
Compensation Court barred a claim in District Court even though the employee's claim before
the Workers' Compensation Court was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The elements of
the employee's waiver were stated as follows:
Three essential elements, all present here, must coincide to make preclusion through
waiver by prior election of remedies available: (a) two or more remedies must be in
existence (b) the available remedies must be inconsistent (c) choice of one remedy and
its pursuit to conclusion must be made with knowledge of alternatives that are
available.
Id. These principles would also apply to a failure to make payments pursuant to a workers'
compensation award. A claimant would have one remedy through the Workers' Compensation
Court system and perhaps a second remedy for bad faith through the District Court. Allowing a
claimant to maintain two separate actions for the same remedy in different Courts would be
inconsistent, as was the case in Pryse, and the claimant (at least through his attorney) would
presumably have notice of the possibility of maintaining either of the two actions.
39. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
40. See Fleet v. Sanguine Ltd., 854 P.2d 892, 901 (Okla. 1993). See also Hadnot v. Shaw,
826 P.2d 978, 987 (Okla. 1992); Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Eng'g, Inc., 755 P.2d 669, 672 n.13
(Okla. 1988); Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855, 863 n.20 (Okla. 1987); Reams v. Tulsa Cable
Television, Inc., 604 P.2d 373, 375 (Okla. 1979); Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 572 P.2d 966, 969
(Okla. 1978).
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The jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court continues
even after an order awarding benefits has been entered:
In case of disobedience of any person to comply with the order of
the Commission.... the judge of the district court of the county in
which the person resides, or of the county in which such hearing is
being conducted, on application of any member of the board, or any
inspector or examiner appointed by it, shall compel obedience by
attachment proceedings as for contempt, as in the case of disobedi-
ence of requirements of subpoena issued from such court on a re-
fusal to testify therein.41
Only a member of the workers' compensation board, or an individual
acting under its authority, can maintain an action to compel payments
in a court other than the Workers' Compensation Court. The Act pro-
vides that
[t]he power and jurisdiction of the [Workers' Compensation] Court
over each case shall be continuing and it may, from time to time,
make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings
or orders relating thereto if, in its opinion, it may be justified,....42
The jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court also contin-
ues over an employee's claim for benefits under an insurance policy.43
After following specific procedures, an independent action may be
brought.' Furthermore, the "[p]ositive requirements of section 122
of the [Workers' Compensation] Act deprive the district courts of any
jurisdiction over matters within the scope of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act."45
These authorities clearly state that the Workers' Compensation
Court continues to have exclusive jurisdiction over an employee's
claim for benefits under an insurance policy, even after an award has
been entered. Therefore, the principle that only intentional acts fall
outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation
Court would also apply to actions taken in the process of evaluating a
41. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 80 (West 1992) (emphasis added).
42. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 84 (West 1992).
43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 42(A) (West 1992).
44. Id. The statute states:
If payment of compensation or an installment payment of compensation due under the
terms of an award, except in a case of appeals from an award, is not made within ten
(10) days after the same is due by the employer or insurance carrier liable therefore,
the Court may order a certified copy of the award to be filed in the office of the court
clerk and the county clerk of any county, which award whether accumulative or lump
shall be entered on the judgment docket of the district court, and shall have the same
force and be subject to the same law as judgments of the district court.
Id.
45. Crowder v. Continental Materials Co., 590 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla. 1979).
1995]
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claim and making payments. Only intentional acts during that process
fall outside the exclusivity of jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers'
Compensation Court.46
This principle is stated clearly in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Ex-
change,47 a case cited with approval in Goodwin.48 The Unruh Court
held that a workers' compensation carrier has "not stepped out of its
proper role as an insurer in the compensation scheme" even though it
acts negligently in the processing of a claim.49 It also noted that "the
nature of the insurer's role is not changed merely because its usual
functions may have been performed negligently. '50 Although the
Court acknowledged that "a negligent investigation of an employee's
claim may well be an aberration in the carrier's normal activities," it
went on to conclude that it could "find no justification in either statu-
tory or policy considerations for treating the negligent carrier as no
longer acting as a carrier but rather as a third party" so as to incur
liability apart from the workers' compensation framework. 1 Instead,
only when the "insurer intentionally embarks upon a deceitful course
of conduct in its investigations which causes injury to the subject of
the investigation" may liability apart from the workers' compensation
framework exist.52
The reasoning of the Court in Unruh, endorsed in Goodwin, dem-
onstrates that only intentional actions may be independently actiona-
ble apart from the workers' compensation framework. This principle
has been applied in numerous jurisdictions with consistent results. For
example, in Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co.,53 the California Appellate
Court affirmed the dismissal of a workers' compensation claimant's
amended complaint. 4 The plaintiff had alleged a bad faith claim
against a workers' compensation insurer, and also a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.5 5 The Court held that the alle-
gations of bad faith were insufficient to overcome workers'
46. Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 434 (Okla. 1992).
47. 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1972).
48. Goodwin, 828 P.2d at 436 n.21.
49. Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1070.
50. Id. at 1071.
51. Id. at 1073.
52. Id.
53. 183 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 504.
[Vol. 30:507
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compensation exclusivity, and that the conduct alleged was not suffi-
ciently outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.56 The Appellate Court cited Unruh, noting that there
the carrier "in the course of a deceitful investigation, through an agent
who established an ostensibly romantic relationship with the appli-
cant, engaged in affirmative conduct which was independently tor-
tious. ' '5 7 The establishment of a direct relationship, in Unruh a
romantic relationship, took the insurer outside its contemplated role
within the workers' compensation scheme.
The Ricard Court distinguished its facts from the Unruh scenario,
stating:
Here, by contrast, no relationship is alleged between plaintiff and
defendant other than that of claimant and insurer. The insurance
carrier committed no affirmative conduct which took it outside its
role as an insurer so as to invest itself with a "dual personality"
subject to liability at law.5"
The Court noted "a distinction between negligent and intentional mis-
conduct" and stated that "we are not so naive as to believe that insur-
ance carriers do not on occasion frustrate the objectives of the
workers' compensation statute by intentionally dragging their feet."5 9
Nevertheless, barring the extreme circumstances of the Unruh exam-
ple, no independent bad faith claim could be asserted.
Similarly, in Everfield v. State Compensation Insurance Fund60 a
carrier's alleged inconsistent delays in payments and arbitrary reduc-
tion in amounts was held not actionable, notwithstanding allegations
that the conduct was intentional, deceitful, fraudulent and in bad
faith.6 ' The Court held that the conduct of the insurer constituted "no
more than.., a nonperformance of a statutory duty to provide tempo-
rary disability benefits under the Labor Code."'62 The Court further
held that "ordinary nonperformance of a statutory duty owed by re-
spondent to appellant is insufficient" to state a claim when the allega-
tions do not rise to the tortious level of outrageous conduct.63
56. Id. at 507.
57. Id. at 506.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 507.
60. 171 Cal. Rptr. 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
61. Id. at 165.
62. Id. at 166.
63. Id.
1995]
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The plaintiff in Soto v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.64 faced a simi-
lar situation. Although he alleged "a willful delay in payment of bene-
fits" by a workers' compensation insurer, the Court held that he was
not entitled to tort recovery.65 The Court also held that because the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, "a fortiori he has likewise failed to succeed in placing
himself beyond WCAB jurisdiction on the theory of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress and on the theory of a grievance based on
any breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or
any supposed violation of [the Workers' Compensation Statutes]. 66
Following this same rationale, the Court in Cervantes v. Great
American Insurance Co.67 held that an initial refusal even to investi-
gate a claim, and a refusal to make any payment until after the claim
had been ified and processed to'a successful conclusion before the
Workers' Compensation Court, was not independently actionable as
bad faith.68 The Washington Court of Appeals reached a similar re-
sult in Deeter v. Safeway Stores, Inc.69 The Deeter Court noted that
workers' compensation "immunity is lost when either the employer or
the claims adjuster embarks upon a deceitful course of conduct consti-
tuting the tort of outrage."7 Citing Unruh, the Court concluded that
"conduct, although arguably vexatious and irresponsible, did not rise
to the level of 'outrageous conduct' exhibited by the carrier in Un-
ruh."'" Additionally, the Court noted that the claimant had failed to
"exhaust administrative remedies" prior to commencing the action.72
The Illinois Court of Appeals encountered particularly egregious
conduct in Echelbarger v. Dixon Publishing Co.73 where it held that
withholding workers' compensation payments was not actionable
outside the Workers' Compensation Act, even where the plaintiff al-
leged that payments were withheld "repeatedly and as a pattern of
conduct."'74 The Echelbarger Court relied upon a decision of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co.,75 holding
64. 229 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. CL App. 1986).
65. Id. at 197.
66. Id.
67. 189 Cal. Rptr. 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
68. Id. at 768.
69. 747 P.2d 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
70. Id. at 1108.
71. Id. at 1109.
72. Id.
73. 582 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
74. Id. at 296.
75. 448 N.E.2d 866 (I1. 1983).
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that recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act "is the exclusive
remedy for a plaintiff whose damages arise solely from unreasonable
or vexatious delay in payment."'76
In Hastings v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Companies,7 7 the Court
held that a workers' compensation insurer's termination of benefits
was not actionable. 78 In Farley v. CNA Insurance Co.,7 9 "an unsympa-
thetic attitude" on the part of the workers' compensation carrier's
agent did not constitute actionable conduct.8 0 The Farley Court even
acknowledged that the evidence did suggest that the carrier gave
claimant "the run-a-round" by not paying bills on time and not au-
thorizing medical treatment."1 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
"there is clearly a threshold beyond which an insurance company's
recalcitrance must go before it crosses into outrageous conduct."'
The Court found that threshold not to have been reached in Farley.3
As these decisions from other jurisdictions indicate, a bad faith
claim against a workers' compensation carrier requires more than neg-
ligence in the processing and handling of a claim. So long as a carrier
is performing its function within the workers' compensation frame-
work, even if it does so negligently, the carrier remains entitled to the
protection afforded by workers' compensation exclusivity.
The Goodwin plurality applied this principle to Oklahoma law,
discussing the parameters of a bad faith cause of action as first recog-
nized in Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.'4 However, the
plurality also cited provisions of the Oklahoma Unfair Claims Settle-
ment Practices Act.8 That Act, however, does not give rise to a pri-
vate right of action. 6 Thus, the discussion by the plurality of
principles governing an insurer's decision to pay a claim does not inev-
itably lead to the conclusion that a cause of action is necessarily
created.
A curious circumstance of the Goodwin opinion is that the plural-
ity, which appeared to be outlining the parameters of a bad faith
76. Echelbarger, 582 N.E.2d at 296.
77. 404 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Ct App. 1987)
78. Id.
79. 576 So. 2d 158, 160 (Ala. 1991).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
85. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1221-28 (West 1992).
86. Walker v. Chouteau Lime Co., 849 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Okla. 1993) ("[W]e hold the [Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices] Act does not provide a private remedy under the Act").
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claim, relied upon authorities from other jurisdictions which reject an
independent cause of action for a bad faith failure to make payments
pursuant to a workers' compensation award. These authorities do,
however, recognize a separate cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress as outside the jurisdiction of workers' compensa-
tion where the carrier steps outside its role within the workers' com-
pensation framework and creates a separate and distinct relationship
to the plaintiff.'
In Farley, the first case cited by the Oklahoma Supreme Court,8
the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the
grounds that there was no actionable bad faith claim and affirmed a
directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the grounds that plain-
tiff's evidence failed to show sufficiently outrageous conduct.8 9 As to
the first holding, the Farley Court cited previous authorities in which it
"held that a bad faith claim against a workmen's compensation insur-
ance carrier is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Alabama
Workmen's Compensation Act."9 However, the court also noted that
it had "previously recognized that the tort of outrageous conduct can
exist in a workmen's compensation setting." 91
The second case cited by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, while
acknowledging that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress would be available, similarly declined to recognize a bad faith
action.92 The Washington Supreme Court observed that
[s]everal Courts and other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of
whether a civil cause of action lies for wrongful delay or termination
of workers' compensation benefits... [and] "[iln the great majority
of these cases, for one reason or another, a cause of action was held
not to lie." 93
As did the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Goodwin, the Washington
Supreme Court acknowledged that "when the employer injures the
employee with the deliberate intention of doing so" an action would
not be barred by exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation
87. Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 436 n.1 (Okla. 1992).
88. Farley v. CNA Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1991).
89. Id. at 159.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Wolf v. Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc., 782 P.2d 203, 205 (wash. 1989). The Court held that
"ftthe Industrial Insurance Act expressly provides a remedy within the workers' compensation
system for wrongful delay or termination of workers' compensation benefits; and that is the
exclusive remedy for any such wrongful delay or termination." Id.
93. Id. (quoting Anmtm LAR oN, WoRKmEN's COMPENSATION, § 68.34(e), at 13-1272 to
13-1280 (1988)).
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statutes.94 The Wolf Court went on to note specifically that the statu-
tory immunity would be lost "when the employer's conduct, or the
conduct of a company hired by the employer to administer workers'
compensation claims, constitutes the tort of outrage." 95
The Goodwin Court also cited Unruh v. Truck Insurance Ex-
change where the California Supreme Court held that
an insurer is still acting within its proper role in the compensation
scheme, and may not be sued at law as a "person other than the
employer" under Section 3852, when it provides negligent medical
treatment for a compensable injury or when it negligently inspects
the employer's premises....
.[t]he nature of the insurer's role is not changed merely because
its usual functions may not have been performed negligently ....
We can find no justification either in statutory or policy considera-
tions for treating the negligent carrier as no longer acting as a car-
rier but rather as a third party.96
Under this rationale, so long as a workers' compensation insurance
carrier is acting pursuant to its role within the general workers' com-
pensation scheme, it is still protected by workers' compensation exclu-
sivity. This is entirely consistent with Oklahoma law which grants the
Workers' Compensation Court continuing jurisdiction with respect to
its own orders and awards,' and which treats an employer and its
insurance carrier as one for the purposes of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.98 Nevertheless, as was the case in Alabama and Washington,
the California Supreme Court held that an insurer could be held liable
for an independent tort when "such insurer intentionally embark[ed]
upon a deceitful course of conduct in its investigations which cause[d]
injury to the subject of the investigation." 99 Specifically, in Unruh, the
94. Id. at 209. Cf. Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431,434 (Okla. 1992) (noting
that "by definition intentional, wilful acts are not within the purview of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act").
95. Wolf, 782 P.2d at 209. The "tort of outrage" is an alternative name for a claim for
"intentional infliction of emotional distress." Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 76 (Okla. 1986).
96. Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1071-72 (Cal. 1972).
97. See O 11A. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 84 (West 1992).
98. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Theus, 493 P.2d 433,435 (Okla. 1972). See State
ex rel Ammons v. Breckenridge, 442 P.2d 506 (Okla. 1968). The Court in Ammons held that
[e]xcept when the workers' compensation laws of this state authorize, or provide for,
the determination of particular matters arising under those laws, by some other Court
or Courts, the [Workers' Compensation Court] has the exclusive, original jurisdiction to
determine.., the liability of... insurance carriers under those laws, and any rights
asserted under those laws.
Id. at 509.
99. Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1073.
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insurer's agent embarked upon a deceitful romance with the claimant
in order to trick her into performing activities which would be filmed
by an additional, hidden agent."° Again, the point is that intentional
acts specifically intended to harm a claimant are separately actionable
apart from the workers' compensation scheme.
The penultimate case cited with approval by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court was a Florida Court of Appeals decision which dis-
missed bad faith or negligence claims against a workers' compensation
insurer and allowed a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.10 1 The Bowen Court noted that
[a] growing number of courts permit workers to penetrate the exclu-
sive remedy shield in employment related injuries where the basis
of the action against the employer's insurer is an intentional mali-
cious tort.102
Applying this standard, the Bowen Court allowed the claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress to proceed, holding that "a com-
mon law tort claim is permitted only where the nonpayment involves
outrageous conduct which causes emotional distress."' 3
A decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals was the final au-
thority cited with approval by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.0 4 The
Minnesota Court, citing Unruh, held as follows:
Other states which have this exclusive remedy provision in their
workers' compensation act, have established a juridically created
exception to this rule. These Courts have consistently refused to
allow common law claims unless the employer's insurance carrier
intentionally engages in outrageous and extreme conduct which
cannot be justified by the needs of normal investigation or defensive
claims.' 05
The Court also emphasized that no action would lie for "less extreme
conduct, such as wrongful refusal to pay claims."" 6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited and relied upon the above
authorities in reaching its conclusion in Goodwin. Consideration of
these authorities reveals the true significance of the Goodwin deci-
sion: any independent action against a workers' compensation insurer
must be one which satisfies the very stringent requirements of a claim
100. Id.
101. Bowen v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 512 So. 2d 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
102. Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
104. Dennison v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
105. Id. at 450 (citing Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
106. Id.
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for intentional infliction of emotional distress."°7 The plaintiff in
Goodwin asserted only a bad faith claim, but the Court speculated as
to a claim of "outrage."'10 The Court noted that the law in plaintiff's
situation would defeat either action.109 Oklahoma adheres to a
"transactional" approach to identifying causes of action, and the same
factual situation, gives rise to but one cause of action. 10 Therefore,
the only permissible claim is one where the facts are sufficient to con-
stitute the tort of outrage. Accordingly, for purposes of rendering an
opinion in Goodwin, the Oklahoma Supreme Court only "assumed" a
bad faith action would be available. However, the only true cause of
action is one for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
III. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has yet to grant its final seal of
approval on a bad faith cause of action in the workers' compensation
context. The plurality in Goodwin merely outlined principles of bad
faith law which may be applicable in the workers' compensation con-
text, but nevertheless fell short of recognizing such a claim. Estab-
lished principles of workers' compensation law suggest the following
limitations: first of all, no action can be maintained prior to the entry
of an award of the Workers' Compensation Court awarding benefits;
prior to that time, any claim would be indistinguishable to one for
benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. Second, after
an order of the Workers' Compensation Court has been entered
awarding benefits, the better approach would require a claimant to
certify the order for enforcement through the District Court, and a
claim for bad faith would be limited to actions taken by the insurer
after such certification. Third, in no event would a carrier be liable for
merely negligent processing of a claim, or a merely negligent failure to
107. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982). In Timmons, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a claim for emotional distress in a bad faith action did not
have to rise to the level necessary to maintain an independent claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 916. In that case, the Court made a standard distinction between
"mental suffering" as an independent cause of action and as an element of damages which may
be recovered in a claim based upon "an otherwise actionable transgression." Id. The existence
of such an "otherwise actionable transgression" is necessary to recover "emotional suffering" in
a cause of action. Id. Because no bad faith claim is even possible until after the Workers' Com-
pensation Court has entered an order awarding benefits, there is no "otherwise actionable trans-
gression" to support a claim for emotional distress. Id. Therefore, the emotional distress would
have to be independently actionable, as was the case in Unruh.
108. Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 431, 432 n.1 (Okla. 1992).
109. Id.
110. Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855,863 (Okla. 1987); Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 512
P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1978).
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pay an award, because such a carrier would still be fulfilling its func-
tion within the general scheme of workers' compensation law, albeit
poorly. Finally, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
would remain a distinct and separate possible cause of action, but only
when the insurer steps outside its role within the workers' compensa-
tion framework and establishes a direct relationship with the claimant.
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